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Applying Constitutional Standards
To Airport Security Searches
INTRODUCTION

The crime of air piracy dates back to as early as 1930,1 but did
not become a real threat to the American airline industry until 1968,
a year in which eighteen domestic, in addition to twelve foreign, hijackings occurred.2 The next year witnessed no less than forty attempted
hijackings of United States planes, of which thirty-three were success-

ful.' Since 1969 there has been a general leveling off of attempted
4
hijackings, with approximately thirty occurring each year.
The Federal Aviation Authority, having primary responsibility for
dealing with the hijacking problem, established a Task Force on the
Deterrence of Air Piracy in October, 1968. 5 Its principal product was
the "hijacker personality profile," a compilation of behavioral characteristics of the "typical" hijacker.'
Working together with airlines,
the FAA established a security system for operation at airports around
the country which included utilization of the profile, an electronic
screening device such as a magnetometer or metal detection device,
1. The first hijacking was performed by Peruvian revolutionaries for propaganda
purposes and was regarded as a freak occurrence until the end of World War HI when
refugees in Eastern Europe began utilizing air hijacking as a means to pass across the
Iron Curtain. This continued until intensive travel restrictions were imposed by these
Eastern European countries in 1953. Aggarwala, Political Aspects of Hijacking, INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION, Nov., 1971, at 7, 8.
2. Id. at 9. Prior to 1968, only seven United States planes were hijacked, the
first occurring in 1961. Id.
3. Id. Fifty-six of the hijacked planes in 1968-69 were flown to Cuba, a reversal
of the 1958-60 trend in which Cubans fleeing the Castro government attempted sixteen
hijackings, eleven successful, originating from Cuba. It now appears that the "Cuba
phase" of skyjacking is over, as only seven of the thirty-one hijackings in 1972 were
directed for Cuba. Comment, Searching for Hijackers: Constitutionality, Costs, and
Alternatives, 40 U. CI. L. REV. 383, 384 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Searching for
Hijackers].
4. Searching for Hijackers 391.
5. See id. at 386.
6. United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1082 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
See
McGinley and Downs, Airport Searches and Seizures-A Reasonable Approach, 41
FORD. L. REv. 293, 302 (1972) [hereinafter cited as McGinley and Downs].
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and a weapons search of carry-on luggage and/or person if the mag7
netometer had been activated.
The implementation of this or any other security system was voluntary8 and remained so until the FAA "emergency regulation," issued
January 31, 1972, demanded that all the airlines "adopt and put into
use a screening system, acceptable to the Administrator, to prevent
and deter the carriage aboard its aircraft of any sabotage device or
weapon in carry-on baggage or on or about the persons of passengers. . . ."I Thus the FAA for the first time was given the power
to review airport security measures and order changes if needed in
the opinion of its Administrator. 10
On December 5, 1972, the FAA issued a directive that all carry-on
items be searched and an electronic screening of all passengers be implemented no later than January 5, 1973 as a condition for boarding."
In addition, airport operators were required to provide armed law enforcement officers at all boarding gates when passengers are boarding, with authority "to carry and use firearms" and "vested with a police
power of arrest under Federal, State, or other political subdivision authority.'"12
The unprecedented security measures currently in use in the nation's
airports reflect the concern and alarm which skyjacking has evoked
in the public mind. It is the purpose of this article to determine
whether the searches resulting from these strict security measures, necessarily warrantless, can survive constitutional scrutiny, and, if so, to
determine what their limitations may be.
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

The fourth amendment to the Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized.' 3
7. See United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1082-85 (E.D.N.Y. 1971);
United States v. Slocum, 464 F.2d 1180, 1182-83 (3d Cir. 1972); United States v.
Muelener, 351 F. Supp. 1284, 1285 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
8. See Searching for Hijackers 389-90.
9. 37 Fed. Reg. 2500, 2501 (1972).
10. See Searching for Hijackers 390.
11. See United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 901 (9th Cir. 1973).
12. 37 Fed. Reg. 25934-35 (1972). See United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893,
902 (9th Cir. 1973); Searching for Hijackers 392.
13. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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The issuance of a warrant upon approval of a neutral magistrate
before a "reasonable" search can be conducted is the true constitutional
safeguard of the fourth amendment. 4 As was stated by Justice Jackson in Johnson v. United States:
The point of the Fourth Amendment which often is not grasped
by zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be
drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being
judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise
of ferreting out crime. Any assumption that evidence sufficient
to support a magistrate's disinterested determination to issue a
search warrant will justify the officers in making a search without
a warrant would reduce the amendment to a nullity and leave
the people's homes secure only in the discretion of police officers
... . When the right of privacy must reasonably yield to the right
of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial officer, not by
a policeman or government enforcement official. 15
Even if it were practical to station magistrates at boarding gates,
a warrant could not be issued as the requirements of probable cause
are not fulfilled in the typical search situation.' 6 Mere police suspicion is never sufficient for a finding of probable cause; 1 7 airport security searches are conducted upon all persons attempting to board
a commercial airliner in the absence of even mere suspicion. Therefore a magistrate would be barred from issuing a search warrant.
The United States Supreme Court, while not withdrawing from the
position that the police must obtain prior judicial approval of searches
and seizures through the warrant procedure whenever practicable,'8 has
held that the absence of a warrant may be excused when the "exigencies of the situation" make the warrantless search imperative.' 9 For
example, exceptions to the warrant requirement of the fourth amendment have been made when evidence is in danger of "imminent destruction,' '2 or in "plain view," 21 or when the search is conducted "incident to a lawful arrest."22 The only conceivable currently recognized
14. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 481 (1972).
15. 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948).
16. United States v. Muelener, 351 F. Supp. 1284, 1287 (C.D. Cal. 1972). See
United States v.Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1082-84 (E.D.N.Y. 1971); United States v.
Epperson, 454 F.2d 769 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 947 (1972).
17. Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 418-19 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas,
378 U.S. 108, 114-15 (1964).
18. See, e.g., Katz v.United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S.
89 (1964); Chapman v.United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961).
19. McDonald v.United States, 335 U.S. 451, 454-56 (1940).
20. Schmerber v.California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
21. Ker v.California, 374 U.S. 23, 36-37 (1963).
22. Chimel v.California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
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exceptions which may justify the absence of a warrant for searches
conducted at airports under the current security measures are the "protective search for weapons, '2 3 "consent,' 24 and the "administrative
search,"2 5 each of which will be examined later in this article.
The fourth amendment standards of reasonableness do not apply
to the private acts of individuals, but only to government action. 6
However, even if the anti-hijacking measures were applied solely by
airline employees, the airport searches would nevertheless be subject
to constitutional scrutiny due to the active government involvement in
the implementation of the security system.27
The involvement,
whether characterized as "'encouragement' or as 'peripheral, or . . .
one of several cooperative forces leading to the alleged constitutional
violation' " is "significant for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment."2 A search that is "in substance a federal search, cast in the
form of a carrier inspection to enable officers to avoid the requirements
of the Fourth Amendment"2 9 must still meet the constitutional test of
reasonableness.
Before the fourth amendment can be applied to the airport security
measures under discussion, the inspections to which air travelers are
subjected must be demonstrated to be within the constitutional definition of a search or seizure. For this purpose the next section is devoted to an examination of the components of the current anti-hijacking security measures and their possible subjection to constitutional
scrutiny.
AIRPORT SECURITY PROCEDURE

The Profile
Recognizing the difficulty of detecting potential hijackers while still
on the ground, Judge Gewin in United States v. Moreno noted:
Airport security officials have the awesome responsibility of ferreting out hijacking threats from among thousands of passengers
while at the same time avoiding any undue disruption to this nation's heavy flow of commercial air traffic. Inseparably related
to this is the fact that the hijacker's modus operandi is designed
to take optimum advantage of these pressures. The hijacker pre23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1967).
See Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 593-94 (1946).
See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921).
United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 904 (9th Cir. 1973).
Id.

29. Corngold v. United States, 367 F.2d 1, 5 (9th Cir. 1966).

189

Loyola University Law Journal

Vol. 5: 186

fers the anonymity of the crowd where he is but a part of the
blend.3 0
In an effort to distinguish the potential hijacker from the general
traveling public, the FAA in 1968 developed the "hijacker personality
profile," a checklist of behavioral characteristics common to hijackers."1 It is typically applied by airline personnel at the ticket counter
when passengers buy their tickets; individuals exhibiting some or all
of the profile characteristics are designated "selectees" and subjected
to close observation by security officials.3 2 This may include a questioning of the "selectee" and a request for identification, but a patdown or frisk of his person for weapons will not be performed without
a magnetometer or other electronic screening device also having been
activated.33
The profile is of necessity kept secret from the public3 4 and is therefore difficult to critically evaluate. Since there have been only 159
attempted hijackings in the United States, involving 218 hijackers, the
statistical reliability of the profile compiled from such a small sample
is questionable.3 5 In one survey conducted to determine the efficiency
of the profile, of 500,000 persons purchasing airline tickets, .28% or
1,406 were labelled selectees. Of these, approximately 6% were
found to be carrying weapons.3 "
Applying the profile to air passengers is not an invasion of privacy
within the scope of the fourth amendment. Only those readily observable characteristics which the traveler has voluntarily exposed to the
general public or airline are studied.3 7 Furthermore, application of
the profile does not involve any involuntary restraint of the individual.3 8 Therefore, it is not within the fourth amendment meaning of
search or seizure and not subject to constitutional scrutiny.
The Electronic Screening
All passengers must submit to a scanning by an electronic screening
30. 475 F.2d 44, 49 (5th Cir. 1973).
31. United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1082 (E.D.N.Y, 1971).
32. Id. at 1083; McGinley and Downs 303-06.
33. McGinley and Downs 304.
34. See United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1088 (E.D.N.Y. 1971); United
States v. Bell, 464 F.2d 667, 670 (2d Cir. 1972); United States v. Clarke, 475 F.2d 240,
246 (2d Cir. 1973).
35. Searching for Hijackers 397-98.
36. United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1084 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
37. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
38. See Note, Airport Security Searches and the Fourth Amendment, 71 COLUM.
L. REv. 1039, 1052 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Airport Security Searches]; Searching

for Hijackers 397.
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device prior to boarding. 39 The device typically used is a magnetometer or metal detector40 adjusted to discern on a person ferrous metal
equivalent to that in a .32 caliber handgun. 41 It consists of two upright metal poles which, when an individual walks between them, measure distortions in the relatively constant magnetic field surrounding the
earth. 4 - The magnetometer cannot distinguish weapons composed of
ferrous metal from other metallic objects;43 nearly 50% of all airline
passengers carry enough ferrous metal in ordinary belongings, e.g.,
keys, cigarette lighters, coins, etc., to activate the magnetometer.4 4 In
addition, the machine cannot detect weapons composed of material
other than ferrous metal, such as plastic explosives.4 5
The subjection to an electronic screening device such as a magnetometer is a minimal intrusion upon privacy and a minor inconvenience for most passengers. But it is still within the constitutional meaning of a search for purposes of the fourth amendment.4 6
In Katz v. United States,4 7 the United States Supreme Court rejected
the argument that physical intrusion into an enclosure is necessary to
meet the constitutional definition of a search,4 8 and held "the Fourth
Amendment protects people, not places." 49 Justice Harlan, in a concurring opinion, formulated a threshold test 0 for application of the
fourth amendment: if a government intrusion is into an area in which
the individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy, the search is
subject to fourth amendment standards. 5 ' It is the purpose and function of a magnetometer "to search for metal and disclose its presence
in areas where there is a normal expectation of privacy." 52 Thus the
39. See text at supra note 11.
40. More sophisticated devices based on X-rays or fluoroscopy have been used at
certain airports. As these devices are able to better reveal what an individual has
attempted to conceal, there is a greater intrusion upon privacy involved than with a
magnetometer. Thus to demonstrate a magnetometer inspection is within the fourth
amendment meaning of a search or seizure is, by implication, to demonstrate the same
for more sophisticated devices.

See Searching for Hijackers 401-02.

41. Searching for Hijackers 401. See United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077,
1085 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
42. United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1086 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
43. See McGinley and Downs 303; Searching for Hijackers 401.
44. United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1086 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
45.

See McGinley and Downs 303; Searching for Hijackers 401.

46. United States v. Epperson, 454 F.2d 769 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 947
(1972); United States v. Slocum, 464 F.2d 1180 (3d Cir. 1972); United States v. Bell,
464 F.2d 667 (2d Cir. 1972).
47. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
48. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled by Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
49. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
50. *See United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 904 (9th Cir. 1973).
51. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
52. United States v. Epperson, 454 F.2d 769, 770 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 406
U.S. 947 (1972).
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invasion of privacy by use of the magnetometer or other electronic
screening device, while minimal, is within the purview of the fourth
amendment and must be constitutionally justified.
The Frisk and the Search of Carry-onLuggage
While there is no uniform procedure to be followed if a passenger
activates a magnetometer, generally a request for satisfactory identification and other questioning is undertaken by an airline official or federal marshal. The individual may be asked to remove from his pockets
the metallic objects that he claims to be carrying. If the marshal is
still unsatisfied, a pat-down search or frisk will be conducted. 53
Unquestionably, the frisk is subject to fourth amendment standards
of reasonableness. As Chief Justice Warren stated in Terry v. Ohio:
It is quite plain that the Fourth Amendment governs seizures
of the person which do not eventuate in a trip to the station house
and prosecution for crime-"arrests" in traditional terminology.
It must be recognized that whenever a police officer accosts an
individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has "seized"
that person. And it is nothing less than sheer torture of the English language to suggest that a careful exploration of the outer
surfaces of a person's clothing all over'54his or her body in an attempt to find weapons is not a "search.
Similarly, the inspection of the contents of all carry-on luggage prior
to boarding55 is within the constitutional meaning of a search. 56 A
traveler certainly has reasonable expectations of privacy as to the contents of his luggage and an inspection of his private belongings can
57
hardly be considered a minimal intrusion.
Therefore, the electronic screening, the pat-down or frisk, and the
inspection of carry-on luggage are government intrusions of privacy
needing constitutional justification for the absence of a search warrant
issued by a detached, objective magistrate upon a showing of probable
cause. The next section of this article is devoted to an examination
of the possible constitutional justifications.
53. See United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077 (E.D.N.Y. 1971); United
States v. Muelener, 351 F. Supp. 1284 (C.D. Cal. 1972); United States v. Bell,
464 F.2d 667 (2d Cir. 1972).
54. 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1967).
55. See text at supra note 11.
56. See United States v. Legato, 480 F.2d 408 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v.
Clarke, 475 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893 (9th Cir.
1973).
57. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring);
Searching for Hijackers 404.
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EXCEPTIONS TO THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT

Consent
One of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement of the
fourth amendment is consent given for a search.5 8 To operate as a
valid waiver of the right of freedom from unreasonable searches and
seizures, the consent given must be voluntary, unequivocal, specific,
and intelligent. 9 Furthermore, it must be free of duress and coercion.60
In the very recent case of Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,1 the United
States Supreme Court undertook to resolve a conflict between the federal and state courts as to what level of understanding was needed
by the individual acquiescing for the consent to be valid.62 In so doing, Justice Stewart, enunciating the opinion of the Court, stated:
Voluntariness is a question of fact to be determined from all
of the circumstances, and while the subject's knowledge of a right
to refuse is a factor to be taken into account, the prosecution is
not required to demonstrate such knowledge as a prerequisite to
63
establishing a voluntary consent.
Johnson v. Zerbst, a prior case involving the waiver of the constitutional right to counsel, had held that there must be a showing of
an "intentional relinquishment of a known right or privilege," 64 and
was distinguished by the Court in Bustamonte from a waiver of rights
under the fourth amendment. The high standards imposed in the
Johnson case, Justice Stewart reasoned, were for the purpose of preserving the fairness of the trial process. 5 "There is a vast difference
between those rights that protect a fair criminal trial and the rights
' 6
guaranteed under the Fourth Amendment."
Consistent with the Bustamonte rationale is United States v. RuizEstrella, a case involving an airport search in which the prosecution
argued that the defendant had consented to the search. Ruiz-Estrella,
58. Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 593-94 (1946); Zap v. United States,
328 U.S. 624, 628-30 (1946); Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 35 (1970).
59. United States v. Blalock, 255 F. Supp. 268, 269 (E.D. Pa. 1966); United States
v. Como, 340 F.2d 891, 893 (2d Cir. 1965).

60.
States,
61.
62.
People

Gorman v. United States, 380 F.2d 158, 163 (lst Cir. 1967); Wren v. United

352 F.2d 617, 618 (10th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 944 (1966).
412 U.S.218 (1973).
See, e.g., People v. Tremayne, 20 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 98 Cal. Rptr. 193 (1971);
v. Roberts, 246 Cal. App. 2d 715, 55 Cal. Rptr. 62 (1967); Cipres v. United

States, 343 F.2d 95 (9th Cir. 1965); Shoepflin v. United States, 391 F.2d 390 (9th
Cir. 1968).

63.

Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248-49 (1973).

64.

304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).

65.
66.

Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 235-38 (1973).
Id. at 241.
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being identified by the ticket agent as a profile selectee, and unable
to produce satisfactory identification upon request, was taken away
from the boarding gate to a secluded area for questioning by the federal
marshal. There he silently handed his bag to the marshal under cir67
cumstances which the Court reasoned to be inherently coercive.
While Ruiz-Estrella need not have had knowledge of his right to leave
for the "consent" to be a valid waiver, the mere acquiescence to lawful
authority, which his actions indicated, can never be enough to satisfy
the conditions of a freely given consent. 68
Each airline search, as does every case which questions the validity
of consent given for a search, must be decided on an individual basis
depending on the manner and circumstances in which the consent was
procured.6 9 Bustamonte and Ruiz-Estrella provide the basic guidelines
for a determination of the constitutionality of an airport search pursuant to a consent. However helpful this analysis may be on a caseby-case basis, it does not answer the central question of this section
of the article: can this exception to the warrant requirement of the
fourth amendment be used to justify the warrantless, indiscriminate
searching of all passengers attempting to board a commercial airplane?
Obviously there will be instances in which a passenger will object to
being searched; therefore, not all airport searches can be deemed constitutional on the basis of express consent. The only manner in which
the airport security system can withstand constitutional scrutiny on the
basis of the consent exception is if some action or conduct common
to all passengers be shown to manifest an implied consent to be
searched.
One proposed theory would make the act of attempting to board
a plane an implied consent to a search.70 Under this reasoning, making consent a necessary prerequisite to boarding is reasonable "in light
' 71
of the magnitude of the hijacking menace.
67. United States v. Ruiz-Estrella, 481 F.2d 723, 728 (2d Cir. 1973). See also.
United States v. Muelener, 351 F. Supp, 1284, 1288 (C.D. Cal. 1972), in which an
airline passenger who opened his suitcase for inspection after being ordered to do so
by a federal marshal was held to have given his consent in an inherently coercive
situation.
68. United States v. Ruiz-Estrella, 481 F.2d 723, 727 (2d Cir. 1973). Cf. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973); Bumper v. California, 391 U.S. 543, 548-49
(1968).

69.

The United States Supreme Court in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S.

218, 229 (1973), stated: "In examining all the surrounding circumstances to determine if in fact the consent to search was coerced, account must be taken of subtly coercive police questions, as well as the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person
who consents."
70. See Abramovsky, The Constitutionality of the Anti-Hijacking Security System,
22 BUFFALO L. REV. 123, 133-34 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Abramovsky].
71. Id. at 130.
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As previously discussed, a consent must be informed to operate as
a valid waiver of constitutional rights. The unsuspecting passenger
who suddenly finds himself confronted with a search of his person
and luggage can hardly be said to be informed. 72 Furthermore, signs
posted at various points throughout the airport, warning passengers
of the possibility of being searched, do not sufficiently apprise an
individual of the waiver of his constitutional rights.7 3 However, due
to the Bustamonte ruling, a lack of knowledge regarding waiver of
rights may not be as crucial for sustaining the legality of the search
as previously believed under the Johnson decision.
There remains the much more serious problem of infringement upon
the right to travel that conditioning boarding upon consent entails. Although there is no specific provision in the Constitution insuring the
right to travel, the right was recognized as early as 1823 in Cdrfield
v. Coryell. 4 It is derived from the due process clause of the fifth
amendment75 and apparently is a fundamental right; any burden upon
76
it is seemingly subject to strict, careful scrutiny.
Conditioning the exercise of the constitutional right to travel upon
the relinquishment of the fourth amendment right of freedom from
unreasonable searches and seizures is inherently coercive. 77 As other
modes of transportation are inadequate substitutes for air travel, the
traveler unwilling to consent to a search is not left with any reasonable
alternatives by which to exercise a right given a very high priority in
our constitutional framework. Therefore, the consent implied by the
act of attempting to board a plane is not given in the free and voluntary
manner which is required for a valid waiver.
Any theory which proposes to imply consent from an action common
to all prospective passengers must have the same fatal defect: an intolerable burden upon the constitutional right to travel. The consent
exception to the warrant requirement of the fourth amendment cannot
72. United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1092 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), and United
States v. Muelener, 351 F. Supp. 1284, 1288 (C.D. Cal. 1972), have so held, but it
should be noted that both cases were decided before Bustamonte and are therefore

subject to criticism and possible revision on this issue.

73. United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1092 (E.D.N.Y.
States v. Muelener, 351 F. Supp. 1284, 1288 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
74. 6 F. Cas. 546, 552 (No. 3230) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823).

75.

1971); United

Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125 (1958); Aptheker v. Secretary of State,

378 U.S. 500, 505 (1964); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 14 (1965).

76.

Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 339 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394

U.S. 618, 634 (1969).

But see Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Authority District v.

Delta Airlines, 405 U.S. 707 (1972), in which the Court used a reasonable relation test,
rather than strict scrutiny test, to uphold a dollar fee on all airline passengers.
77. United States v. Kroll, 481 F.2d 884, 886 (8th Cir. 1973); United States v.
Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1092-93 (E.D.N.Y. 1971); United States v. Muelener,
351 F. Supp. 1284, 1288 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
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excuse the indiscriminate warrantless searches of all prospective passengers; one must look elsewhere for possible constitutional justification
for the security systems currently employed at the airports to detect hijackers.
The Protective Search for Weapons
The vast majority of courts reviewing airport searches have upheld
the constitutionality of the searches on the basis of the protective search
for weapons exception to the warrant requirement of the fourth amendment."8 This exception was formulated primarily for the protection
of a police officer or others nearby when investigating the suspicious
activity of armed and dangerous individuals at close range, 9 and
is based on a substantial but lower level of suspicion than is needed
for probable cause. 0
The exception was first applied by the United States Supreme Court
in Terry v. Ohio.8
In this case a police detective with thirty-nine
years of experience observed two men pacing repeatedly before a downtown Cleveland department store, occasionally pausing to peer into the
display window or confer with one another. Suspicious that the men
were "casing a job, a stick-up," the officer followed the men when
they left the area to meet with a third man. When they returned to
the department store, the detective, having decided the situation called
for direct action, approached the men and asked their names. The
only response was a mumbled answer, and the detective, fearful that
the suspects were armed, spun one of the men around and patted down
the outside of his clothing. Because he felt a hard, noticeable bulge
in the breast pocket, the detective ordered the suspect to remove his
coat, uncovering a pistol.82
The detective's actions were found to be reasonable and appropriate
under the circumstances. Distinguishing between a limited search of
outer clothing or frisk and a full exploratory search,83 the Court directed attention to the "specific and articulable facts" in the case
which, although each may have been seemingly innocent in itself, taken
78. See, e.g., United States v. Fern, 484 F.2d 666 (1973); United States v. Moreno,
475 F.2d 44 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Epperson, 454 F.2d 769 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 406 U.S. 947 (1972).
79. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 29 (1967); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 64
(1967). See LaFaye, Street Encounters and the Constitution: Terry, Sibron, Peters,
and Beyond, 67 MIcH. L. REV. 40, 40-46 (1968).
80. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1967).
81. 392 U.S. 1 (1967).
82. Id. at 6-7.
83. Id. at 26.
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as a whole warranted the limited invasion of the defendant's privacy
for the protection of the police officer.8 4 The Court emphasized that
for such a search to meet the constitutional standard of reasonableness,
the threat to the police officer or others nearby had to be substantial
and immediate; the officer must be justified "in believing that the individual whose suspicious behavior he is investigating at close range is
armed and presently dangerous. . . ." (emphasis added)"
A protective weapons search, justified at its inception, may become
unreasonable if its scope is not confined to what is minimally necessary for the officer's protection. In Sibron v. New York, the companion case to Terry, the officer made no initial exploration for arms
before "thrusting" his hand into the defendant's pocket, and discovering envelopes of heroin. 6 The Court held the search unreasonable
because it "was not reasonably limited in scope to the accomplishment
of the only goal which might conceivably have justified its inceptionthe protection of the officer by disarming a potentially dangerous man.
Such a search violates the guarantee of the Fourth Amendment.
"87

In Adams v. Williams,"" the Supreme Court expanded the Terry
exception by allowing a police officer to make a protective search for
the deterrence of a possessory offense rather than a crime of violence
when the only basis for fear of danger was an uncorroborated informant's tip.8 9 Rejecting the defendant's argument that the facts known
to the police officer prior to the search did not meet the high standards required by Terry, the Court held the information of a reliable
informant to be sufficient for the specificity of information necessary
to justify a valid protective search for weapons.9"
The lower federal courts have applied the protective search exception
in a multitude of different ways to airport searches. United States
v. Epperson upheld the indiscriminate magnetometer searching of all
persons boarding planes on the basis that the overwhelming public interest in the deterrence of hijacking outbalanced the minimal invasion
84.
85.
86.
87.
which
armed

Id. at 28.
Id. at 24.
392 U.S. 40, 65 (1967).
Id. at 65. See also Tinney v. California, 408 F.2d 912 (9th Cir. 1969), in
a search by an officer who did not believe the suspect being investigated was
and dangerous was held unconstitutional because not limited to the discovery

of weapons.
88. 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
89. See Comment: Criminal Law: The Informant's Tip as a Basis for Stop and
Frisk, 12 WASHBURN L.J. 102, 106 (1972).

90.

Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147-48 (1972).
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of privacy which a magnetometer screening entails."' The positive
reading, the court reasoned, provided the reasonable suspicion necessary for the subsequent frisk of the defendant. 92 In United States v.
Lopez the exhibition of characteristics of the hijacker personality profile, although not sufficient in itself for a finding of probable cause,
was found to provide the specific and articulable facts needed for a
magnetometer search. 93 The court held that activation of a magnetometer, in combination with conformity to the profile, justified the further government intrusion of a pat-down or frisk.94
United States v. Lindsey upheld a search of a prospective passenger
acting suspiciously in the boarding lounge who could not produce adequate identification when requested to do so by a federal marshal. Recognizing the level of suspicion to be lower than that approved in Terry,
the court held that:
In the context of a possible airplane hijacking with the enormous consequences which may flow therefrom, and in view of the
limited time in which [the federal marshal] had to act, the level
of suspicion required for a Terry investigative stop and protective
search should be lowered. 95
In United States v. Slocum a search of carry-on luggage was approved after a frisk of the passenger had failed to disclose what had
activated a magnetometer.9 6 A similar search of carry-on luggage was
not upheld in United States v. Muelener9 7 because it was not preceded
by a pat-down of the defendant's outer clothing. Thus, the court reasoned, the search was not reasonably limited in scope to the detection
of weapons, as a pat-down might have obviated the need for searching
the suitcase. 98 Reflecting the conflict and inconsistencies which antihijacking security searches have evoked in the federal courts, the Fifth
Circuit in United States v. Skipwith expressly declined to follow the
Muelener rule and allowed the searching of hand-luggage as necessary
for the detection of easily concealed plastic explosives.9 9
91. 454 F.2d 769, 771 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 947 (1972). See also
United States v. Bell, 464 F.2d 667, 673 (2d Cir. 1972).
92. United States v. Epperson, 454 F.2d 769, 772 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 406
U.S. 947 (1972).
93. 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1100 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). However, the search considered in
Lopez was found invalid due to discriminatory application of the profile by airline
personnel.
94. Id. at 1096-97.
95. 451 F.2d 701, 703 (3d Cir. 1971). But see United States v. Ruiz-Estrella,
481 F.2d 723 (2d Cir. 1973), in which only conformity to the profile was held not to
supply the reasonable suspicion needed for a search of a passenger's hand luggage.
96. 464 F.2d 1180, 1183 (3d Cir. 1972).
97. 351 F. Supp. 1284 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
98. Id. at 1292.
99. 482 F.2d 1272, 1277 (5th Cir. 1973).
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Indeed, the Fifth Circuit, relying upon Terry for precedent, has labelled airports "critical zones in which special fourth amendment considerations apply."' 0 Citing with approval the concurring opinion of
Judge Friendly in United States v. Bell that due to the hijacking threat,
danger alone meets the constitutional test of reasonableness,'
the
court in United States v. Skipwith held that anyone who presents himself for boarding is subject to a search based on mere or unsupported
suspicion.10 2 However, the suspect need not be in the boarding area
to be searched; an individual acting suspiciously may be taken from
a washroom'
or a parking lot 0 4 and brought to the airport security
office for a search much more intrusive then the pat-down of outer
clothing allowed in Terry v. Ohio.10
It is the contention of this author that the protective weapons search
is inappropriate to serve as a constitutional justification for airport security searches. The bases upon which Terry was decided-the reasonable suspicion of danger founded on specific and articulable facts
and the immediacy of the threat-are lacking when the federal marshals perform the pre-boarding searches. To so lower the standards
of this exception as the lower courts have done would likely have adverse repercussions upon the validity of protective searches in other
contexts, such as the Terry or Sibron type of street confrontation with a
suspected criminal.
Under the current anti-hijacking security measures, all passengers
must submit to an electronic screening as a condition for boarding. 0 6
The Epperson court misinterpreted Terry as allowing such a minimal
intrusion solely on the basis of the "overwhelming" public interest in
the prevention of skyjacking. Any protective search within the confines of the fourth amendment, no matter how inoffensive, must be
grounded upon a reasonable suspicion of danger; the airport searches
are performed indiscriminately regardless of the level of suspicion of
the individual searched. Therefore, the protective weapons search ex10 7
ception cannot justify the electronic searching of all passengers.
Similarly, the searching of all carry-on luggage' 08 cannot be vali100. United States v. Moreno, 475 F.2d 44, 51 (5th Cir. 1973).
101. 464 F.2d 667, 675 (2d Cir. 1972) (Bell, J., concurring).
102. 482 F.2d 1272, 1276-77 (5th Cir. 1973).
103. United States v. Moreno, 475 F.2d 44 (5th Cir. 1973).
104. United States v. Legato, 480 F.2d 408 (5th Cir. 1973).
105. 392 U.S. 1 (1967). The Fifth Circuit will allow any search, including a thorough examination of a suspect's overcoat (Moreno) or a shopping bag he is carrying
(Legato), if it is reasonably related to the thwarting of hijacking. See also United
States v. Fern, 484 F.2d 666 (1973).
106. See text at supra note 11.
107. See 7 U. RICH. L. REV. 362, 364 (1972).
lO
See text at supra note 11.
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dated by this exception. These searches are also performed indiscriminately and therefore not based upon reasonable suspicion as is required
by Terry. The search of an individual's suitcase or briefcase is certainly a more offensive invasion of privacy than a mere electronic
screening and needs, perhaps more so than a magnetometer, a prior
reasonable suspicion of danger to be valid. 10 9
Several courts and legal scholars have proposed that the profile provides the reasonable suspicion needed for a magnetometer search." 0
However, as was previously discussed, the reliability of the profile is
very questionable; only 6% of the selectees are found to be carrying
weapons."' This small percentage is hardly a circumstance that would
"warrant a man of reasonable caution" to take immediate steps to neutralize the threat of danger which the Supreme Court deemed to be
a prerequisite to a valid weapons search." 2
Predicating a pat-down or carry-on luggage search on a positive
magnetometer reading in combination with selection by the profile suffers the same fatal flaw of insufficient grounds for suspicion. Nearly
1 13
50% of all passengers activate the magnetometer at boarding gates;
even in combination with the profile this does not provide the security
official performing the search with the specific and articulable facts
needed for a reasonable suspicion of the individual subjected to the
4
search.1
The courts applying the protective search exception to airport
searches appear to have overlooked the very important requirement that
the suspect must pose an immediate threat to the safety of the police
officer or others in the nearby area. The security searches extend to
articles of the prospective passenger, accessible only after the individual
has boarded the plane." 5 As there is very little danger that a potential hijacker, seeking anonymity in the crowd of the traveling public,
will make use of a weapon during the pre-boarding process, the airport
security searches are outside the scope of the protective weapons exception.
109. United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 905-06 (9th Cir. 1973); Searching for
Hijackers 404.
110. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077 (E.D.N.Y. 1971);
Abramovsky 136.
111. See text at supra note 36.
112. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1967).
A similar compilation of characteristics of the typical mugger or narcotics addict could be prepared, but to base
searches in high crime areas solely on such a profile would be patently unconstitutional.
McGinley and Downs 314.
113. See text at supra note 44.
114. See McGinley and Downs 314. But see Airport Security Searches 1054.

115.
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The author cannot agree with the Lindsey court that the hijacking
problem dictates a lowering of the Terry standards. Such a ruling
places in jeopardy the safeguards carefully included by the Supreme
Court in Terry to insure that a watering down of the fourth amendment
would not develop. The exception was designed for the protection
of police officers doing field interrogation of suspected criminals; a
lowering of standards for a valid airport search would probably give rise
to a lowering of standards in the more common situation in which a police officer feels threatened-the street confrontation with a suspected
criminal. To allow protective searches to extend to circumstances involving little reasonable suspicion of immediate harm is to invite police
behavior specifically condemned by the fourth amendment-the searching of citizens without the prior approval of a neutral magistrate and
based on a lesser standard than probable cause.
The Administrative Search
The administrative search exception is much more adaptable to the
airport security searches than either of the exceptions previously examined. It is designed to allow an administrative agency to accomplish
a purpose of high public utility, under a general regulatory scheme,
in circumstances in which adherence to the warrant requirement of
the fourth amendment would be impractical. The exception is based
upon a series of United States Supreme Court cases outlining the standards of reasonableness to be applied to searches in these special situations.
Camara v. Municipal Court" 6 involved a warrantless inspection of
a private residence by a housing inspector for possible violations of
a municipal housing code. Justice White, announcing the opinion of
the Court, took careful note of the importance of fire, health, and housing code inspections in large metropolitan areas, the long history of
judicial and public acceptance of these inspections, and the relatively
limited intrusion upon privacy involved in such an inspection which
is neither personal in nature nor aimed at the discovery of evidence
of criminal activity."' A test of determining reasonableness was established by "balancing the need to search against the invasion which
the search entails."' 8 However, the public need in Camara was not
held to be dispositive because the burden of procuring a search warrant
116.

117.
118.

387 U.S. 523 (1967).

Id. at 534-37.
Id. at 537.
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was not likely to frustrate the governmental purpose behind the
search." 9
The companion case to Camara, See v. City of Seattle, 2 ' involved
a similar warrantless inspection of a commercial warehouse by a representative of the Seattle Fire Department. The Court recognized
the need for these routine, periodic city-wide inspections for municipal
ordinance violations, but again found the searches unconstitutional because the purpose of the regulatory scheme could be accomplished
while adhering to the warrant requirement of the fourth amendment.'
In Wyman v. James,12 conditioning the continuance of benefits
under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program
upon the recipient's permission for a home visitation by a caseworker
was found not to be an unreasonable invasion of privacy. Stressing
the interview rather than investigative character of the home visit, the
Court initially made the determination that it was not a search within
the meaning of the fourth amendment.''
But, the Court continued,
even assuming that the visitation did fall within the protection of the
fourth amendment, the intrusion upon the privacy of the welfare recipient was held not to be unreasonable. The high public interest in the
protection of the dependent child, the concern of the administrative
agency in knowing how its funds are utilized, the minimal burden upon
the recipient, and the inadequacy of other means for obtaining the
information desired made the home visitation by a caseworker a "reasonable administrative tool," serving a "valid and proper
administrative
1' 24
purpose for the dispensation of the AFDC program.'
In United States v. Biswell, 12 5 the Supreme Court again applied the
administrative search exception to uphold a warrantless government
search. The storeroom of a federally licensed dealer of firearms was
searched pursuant to an inspection procedure authorized by the Gun
Control Act of 1968,126 resulting in the seizure of two sawed-off rifles
which the dealer was not licensed to possess. The inspection procedure was found to be a crucial part of the regulatory scheme necessary
for the prevention of violent crimes, 12 7 and necessarily warrantless:
Here, if inspection is to be effective and serve as a credible
119. Id. at 533.
120. 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
121. Id. at 545.

122. 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
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Id. at 317.
Id. at 318-24, 326.
406 U.S. 311 (1972).
18 U.S.C. § 921 et seq. (1968).
United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 315 (1972).
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deterrent, unannounced, even frequent, inspections are essential.
In this context, the prerequisite of a warrant could easily frustrate
inspection; and if the necessary flexibility as to time, scope, and
frequency is to be preserved, the protections afforded by a war128
rant would be negligible.
Furthermore, when the defendant had chosen to accept the federal
license to deal in firearms, he had done so with the knowledge that
his business records and premises were subject to unannounced inspections.' 29 Thus, the dealer was not "left to wonder about the purposes
of the inspector or the limits of his task."'"3
In Downing v. Kunzig, T ' the Sixth Circuit applied the administrative exception to a security system very analogous to the airport security measures under discussion. In response to bombings of federal
buildings and hundreds of bomb threats, the General Services Administration, having principal responsibility for the protection of federal
property, in October, 1970, issued an order directing the immediate
implementation of strict security measures. These included the denial
of entrance to a federal building to anyone carrying a suspicious package unless he submitted to an examination of the package in ques3 2
tion.1
The court found the threat of violence and destruction to be real
and substantial, and that the searches were conducted for the "strictly
limited purpose of determining that no explosives or dangerous weapons were transported into the building."'3 3
As the procurement of
a search warrant was impractical, the public interest in performing the
searches was balanced against the intrusion of a brief stop and examination of suspicious packages upon the privacy of an individual desiring entrance into a federal building. The searches were found to be
34
reasonable under the circumstances.1
Two lower federal courts have utilized the administrative search exception to justify warrantless airport searches. The luggage search in
the Honolulu airport considered in United States v. Schafer3 5 was
not made for the purpose of anti-hijacking security, but pursuant to
128. Id. at 316.
129. Each licensee annually receives a revised list of ordinances that describe his
duties and the inspectors' authority to make the searches. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(19)
(1968).
130. United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316 (1972).
131. 454 F.2d 1230 (6th Cir. 1972).
132. 40 U.S.C. §§ 318a and 318b (1948) vest the General Services Administration
with the power to establish rules and regulations needed for the protection of federal
property.
133. Downing v. Kunzig, 454 F.2d 1230, 1232 (6th Cir. 1972).
134. Id. at 1233.
135. 461 F.2d 856 (9th Cir. 1972).
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a quarantine of the State of Hawaii imposed by the Secretary of the
Agriculture"" to prevent the spread of certain plant diseases. Because
of the inherent time delays involved, the requirement of procuring a
warrant prior to the baggage search was found likely to frustrate the
purpose of the inspections. "Unless all departing passengers could be
detained while warrants could be obtained, the goods would be moved

before the warrants could issue.

'13 7

The court held the security

searches to be reasonable under the Camara ruling and emphasized
the non-criminal investigative nature of the searches as well as the impossibility of any other means of achieving acceptable results. 13 8
United States v. Davis139 involved the search of a prospective passenger's briefcase during the pre-boarding process in accordance with
airport anti-hijacking security measures. The court found the administrative search exception an appropriate constitutional justification
for a carry-on luggage search only if the passenger had retained the
right to avoid the search by leaving the airport. 40
The author agrees with the Davis court that the only exception to
the warrant requirement applicable to the anti-hijacking security measures is the administrative search exception. The airport searches are
conducted not for the purpose of criminal investigation, but as part
141
of the general regulatory scheme for the deterrence of hijacking.
This is an administrative purpose which will be frustrated by strict
adherence to the warrant requirement due to time delays inherent in
the procedure for obtaining a warrant. As there are no means available to accomplish the desired result other than indiscriminate searching of all passengers, the important public interest in the prevention
of hijackings outweighs the intrusion upon the privacy of the prospective passenger if the search is carefully limited in scope to the purpose
of the security measures-to deter persons from carrying weapons or
explosives on board a commercial airliner.
To be reasonable and therefore constitutional, the airport searches
must be limited to what is minimally necessary for the accomplishment of the deterrence of hijackers; any greater intrusion upon the
privacy of prospective passengers cannot be justified by the administrative search exception. 4 2 The next section of the article is devoted
136.
(1912).

The Secretary of the Agriculture was authorized to do so by 7 U.S.C. § 161

137.

United States v. Schafer, 461 F.2d 856, 858 (9th Cir. 1972).

138.
139.
140.
141.

Id. at 859.
482 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1973).
Id. at 913.
Id. at 908.

142. Cf. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536 (1967); Downing v.
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to a determination of the constitutional limitations on the anti-hijacking
security systems used at airports.
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS

The indiscriminate searching of all passengers, while necessary for
the protection of the traveling public, raises the possibility of abuse
by the security officials conducting the searches. Statistics concerning
the arrests pursuant to the airport security searches during the period
from January, 1971, to November, 1972, demonstrate how real this
possibility is. Of the 3000 persons arrested, fewer than 20% were for
offenses related to hijacking; nearly one-third were for drug possessory
charges, one-third involved illegal entry offenses, and the remainder
were for crimes ranging from parole violation to forgery. 143 That antihijacking searches have at times been converted into general searches
for the purpose of criminal investigation was admitted by the Director
of Security for Pan American World Airways:
We've shaken down people-just by virtue of experience, say
sky marshal or customs experience-we've shaken down any number of people that we've found thoroughly undesirable to have
aboard an airplane but are not basically hijackers. Narcotics!-4 4
we're knocking off people day after day carrying the hard stuff.'
To pass constitutional scrutiny, the airport searches must be strictly
limited to that which is minimally necessary to deter hijackers. The
145
good faith of the security official performing the search is not enough.
The search must be limited to only those areas which might possibly
conceal a weapon accessible to a hijacker aboard a plane when airborne.
Any further investigation is beyond the scope of the administrative search
exception to the warrant requirement.
Search of Checked Luggage
In Chimel v. California,14 the United States Supreme Court held
that a lawful search incident to arrest cannot be made of objects outside the suspect's immediate control. The search incident to arrest
exception to the warrant requirement was formulated to allow the arresting officer to remove any weapons which the arrestee might possibly
Kunzig, 454 F.2d 1230, 1232 (6th Cir. 1972); United States v. Schafer, 461 F.2d 856,
859 (9th Cir. 1972).
143. McGinley and Downs 306.

144.

United States v. Davis. 482 F.2d 893, 909 n.43 (9th Cir. 1973), quoting J.
242 (1972).
See Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 97 (1964); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21
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145.
(1967).
146.

395 U.S. 752 (1969).
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use against the officer in an effort to escape and to prevent the arrestee from concealing or destroying possible evidence. The exception
cannot justify any search beyond the suspect's immediate control--"the
area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or de' 147
structible evidence.'
Similarly, there can be no justification under the administrative
search exception for a search of checked luggage by airport security officers. The purpose of the airport searches is to prevent persons from
carrying onto planes weapons or explosives which might be utilized
to accomplish a hijacking. Checked luggage is inaccessible to passengers during the pre-boarding process and after the plane has taken
off; any objects contained therein cannot possibly be utilized to effect
a hijacking. One must conclude that the searches of checked luggage
are performed only for criminal investigatory purposes, which is clearly
beyond the scope of a permissible search in the absence of a warrant
issued by a magistrate.
Search of Persons Not Attempting to Board
Persons not desiring entrance onto planes, but who are merely in
the airport for other purposes, do not pose any threat of perpetrating
a hijacking. An airport is not, as the Fifth Circuit has decided, a
"critical zone where special fourth amendment considerations apply"
for all persons located in the nearby area.' 4 8 Minimal security measures necessary to deter hijackers need not include searches of individuals who are not boarding planes, and who are therefore not in a position to commit a hijacking. Such warrantless searches cannot be justified by any of the exceptions to the warrant requirement and are violative of the fourth amendment.
Election to Avoid the Search
Conditioning boarding upon submission to a security inspection as
part of a general regulatory scheme is justified by the administrative
exigencies of preventing hijackings. 14 9 However, if the anti-hijacking
system is to involve only the minimal invasion of privacy necessary
to accomplish its purpose, a passenger must be allowed, at any time dur147. Id. at 763.
148. See United States v. Moreno, 475 F.2d 44, 51 (5th Cir. 1973); United States
v. Legato, 480 F.2d 408, 411 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Skipwith, 482 F.2d
1272, 1276 (5th Cir. 1973).

149. This should be distinguished from a consent to search conditioned upon the

exercise of the constitutional right to travel.
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ing the pre-boarding process, to avoid the search by electing not to
The individual who chooses not to board is in
fly at that time.'
as anyone else in the airport not desiring
position
the
same
virtually
access to a plane; as he does not pose an immediate threat of accomplishing a hijacking, he cannot be constitutionally searched without a
properly obtained warrant.
This limitation has been criticized as transforming the airport security system into only a temporary obstacle to the individual who intends
to commit a hijacking. 5 However, if security measures are constantly
maintained, the potential hijacker will again be thwarted should he
attempt to carry weapons onto a plane at a later time. The risk of
a hijacker's successfully passing through a security system in the future
is relatively small compared to the additional intrusion which compulsory searches of all passengers involve.' 5 2
The statistics concerning the number of arrests for other crimes and
the attitude of security officials clearly demonstrate that the officers
performing the security searches have been engaging in pretext searching, i.e., utilizing their power to search for possible hijacking weapons
to discover evidence of other crimes. This is constitutionally impermissible and can be prevented if all passengers are aware of their right
to avoid the search by electing not to fly. Signs posted throughout
the airport warning of the possibility of a search if an individual attempts to board a commercial airliner do not adequately apprise a passenger of his rights and options under the airport security system. 153
An information sheet handed to each passenger when purchasing his
ticket or a verbal warning by the federal marshal prior to searching
would insure that each individual who is searched has voluntarily sub15
mitted to the inspection process. 1
Manner of the Search Must Be Consistent with the Purpose
An airport search which only extends to areas which may possibly
conceal a weapon or explosive may still be unconstitutional if the actions of the officer conducting the search are inconsistent with the only
150. See United States v. Muelener, 351 F. Supp. 1284, 1289 (C.D. Cal. 1972);
United States v. Allen, 349 F. Supp. 749, 752 (N.D. Cal. 1972); United States v.
Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 913 (9th Cir. 1973).

151.

United States v. Legato, 480 F.2d 408 (5th Cir. 1973).

152. United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 911 (9th Cir. 1973).
153. Cf. United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1092 (E.D.N.Y. 1971); United
States v. Muelener, 351 F. Supp. 1284, 1288 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
154. In United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972), the Court emphasized that
information sheets were mailed annually to the firearms dealers apprising them of the
possibility of an inspection of their business premises. Thus the dealers were made
aware of the purpose and limits of the searches performed.
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legitimate purpose of the search: to detect and prevent the carriage
aboard a plane of any weapons which a passenger may use to effect
a hijacking. 155 Too many of the courts have upheld airport searches
with only a cursory examination of how the search was conducted.
The Eighth Circuit refused to follow this trend in deciding United States
v. Kroll." 6
Kroll concerned a search of an attache case which a passenger attempted to carry aboard a plane. The federal marshal stationed at
the boarding gate had become suspicious when the passenger, after
being directed to open the case for inspection, appeared hesitant about
opening the file section in the upper portion of the attache case. For
this reason, the marshal conducted an intensive search which included
the emptying of the contents of an ordinary business envelope located
in the file section. The envelope was found to contain a bag of amphetamines and a small quantity of marijuana.
The court found the marshal's actions to be inconsistent with any
legitimate purpose for the search. The envelope was too small to contain a weapon, and the emptying of the contents in an area crowded
with people demonstrated that the marshal was not seriously searching
for explosives. The court could only conclude that the marshal "was
not searching for weapons of any kind that could be used to hijack
the plane but was searching for contraband."' 5 7 The actions of the
marshal had transformed a search reasonable at its inception into an
unreasonable invasion of the passenger's privacy.
All airport searches should be subjected to the same careful scrutiny
as the search in Kroll. A judicial rebuke for the security official who
oversteps the bounds of a legal search is needed to discourage illegal
pretext searches. The security searches required for the protection of
the traveling public must be conducted in a manner consistent with
the legitimate end of preventing hijackings in order to retain their
reasonableness under the fourth amendment.
CONCLUSION

Air hijacking has only recently emerged as a threat to the safety
of the American traveling public. In response to the wave of hijackings in the late 1960's and early 1970's, the FAA has implemented
in airports across the nation an intensive security system designed to
155. Cf. Sibron v.New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1967).
156. 481 F.2d 884 (8th Cir. 1973).
157. Id. at 887.
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detect and prevent the carriage aboard planes of any weapons or explosives which could be used to commit a hijacking. The security
measures include the indiscriminate searching of all passengers and
their baggage during the pre-boarding process, but due to the inherent
time delay in the procurement of a search warrant issued by a magistrate, these searches are necessarily warrantless.
The administrative search exception to the warrant requirement of
the fourth amendment provides the constitutional justification for the
absence of search warrants. The FAA, under a general regulatory
scheme which includes the searching of passengers, is attempting to
accomplish a purpose of high public utility under circumstances in
which the procurement of a warrant is impractical. Thus the searches
are precisely of the type the administrative search exception is intended
to validate.
However, for the searches to be reasonable by fourth amendment
standards there must be as little government invasion upon privacy
as is minimally necessary to prevent hijackings. In considering airport
search cases, the courts have too often upheld the searches with only
the slightest regard for the intrusiveness which the search involves.
Many security officials have interpreted these rulings as a license to
make general searches for evidence of all crimes.
Indiscriminate general searches by government agents are prohibited
by the fourth amendment. To retain their reasonableness, airport
searches must be strictly confined to only those areas where a weapon
or explosive could be concealed and would be accessible to a hijacker
after the plane is airborne. Furthermore, the federal marshals must
conduct the searches in a manner consistent with the limited purpose
of preventing the particular crime of hijacking. To exceed these limitations is to jeopardize the specific constitutional guarantee of freedom
from unreasonable searches and seizures.
JAY M. MANN
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